In my article I defend the claim that terrorism is morally indefensible, irrespective of the religious or political circumstances and motives behind the actions of its agents and sponsors. My argument is based on the indefeasible presupposition of modern civilization and our human rights culture that, like the prohibition against murder in the law of crimes, the deliberate killing of innocent civilian non-combatants—the principle target of terrorists—destroys the cardinal value of the sacrosanctity of all individual human life by making a (...) dignified or rights-respecting, flourishing social life impossible. In my view the Islamist terrorist network of Al Qaeda (and some Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad) offers a paradigm case of modern terrorism due to the success of their attack on the American homeland on 9/11 (2001).Accordingly, I suggest the outlines of a philosophical critique of some common contemporary views which often thwart a common defense against terrorism because they blur the moral clarity of those who ordinarily respect the dignity and basic rights of persons as well as the rule of law. The views I target include a type of moral relativism, a postmodernist perspectivism, and the “Blowback” thesis currently circulating in some official military and political precincts. In addition, I explain why terrorism so deeply offends the law of war and its correlative Just War tradition; and also I reflect on why rights-based democracies must confront terrorism without subverting their own foundations. (shrink)

It has been argued, and not without emotional detachment, that the Holocaust is unlike other events in world and Jewish history. Those who offer such arguments also claim that comparisons between events of ethnic cleansing, mass murder and other sorts of criminal behavior are not meant to purvey a kind of moral one-upmanship. The suffering and harm in one instance is as morally repugnant as those in any other instance, whether it is a Jewish child gassed and cremated by the (...) Nazis, a black child lynched in the southern United States, an Armenian child deliberately poisoned in a Turkish hospital, a Ukrainian child starved to death in a Stalinist blockade, a Native American child shot to death by Conquistadors, a Rwandan child hacked to death, or a Bosnian child blown to pieces by a land mine or sniper. (shrink)

Modern Western liberalism is a further development of certain philosophical trends which were emerging in the 19th century. It reflects a particular confluence of utilitarian and natural law doctrines, and of ideological expressions of capitalism and socialism. The writings of J.S. Mill stand as among the earliest and most persuasive efforts to reconcile the often conflicting demands these trends have placed upon their interpreters. This study of Mill’s philosophy explores the "incompatibility" of these conflicts as he strives to deal with (...) them in the articulation of his democratic liberalism. Despite the increasing value that socialism held for him, I argue that Mill never really abandons his liberalist philosophy. His lifelong commitment to individualism and utilitarianism, coupled with his rejection of key socialist principles, is sufficient evidence for my conclusion that Mill's philosophy could never reach true socialism insofar as it retains the fundamental concepts of democratic liberalism. (shrink)

In this paper I shall defend the thesis that differing concepts of human nature (or “personhood”) lead to different ideas about what “human rights” are, about what types there are, and how rights are to be ranked according to priority. Though some correlation is obvious, as evidenced in the literature, political forums, and in case studies of many nation-states, the question that we will consider is whether this correlation is a causal relationship or whether it is merely accidental and hence, (...) not worthy of any but passing notice. But if, as I believe, some definite causal connection, perhaps in combination with other factors does exist, we are quite right in focusing attention on the disparate “personhood” concepts or foundation level which lies uncovered and central to such disagreements about human rights. (shrink)

In my paper I propose to explore a defensible philosophical basis for affirming the significant uniqueness of the Holocaust in relation to other similar instances of genocide and, accordingly, to contribute to efforts to better secure its place in history for future generations, especially in terms of its impact on aspects of institutionalized remembrance in law and morality. The twentieth century has been a century of democide (a state’s killing of its own people) and genocide (a state’s murder of its (...) own minorities in the general population): it ought to be or to promote a century of indelible remembrance. Perhaps the twenty-first century will be one not only of further institutionalized forms of remembrance to dissuade future genocidists, but also of the actualization of more effective internal mechanisms for preventing genocidal policies and practices. Short of prevention, however, mechanisms ought to be in place for either intervening in or stopping genocidal atrocities once they begin, and of apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing the perpetrators. Certainly the conceptual framework exists in international law and in popular moral discourse for identifying genocidal possibilities or attempts at genocide. Only a persistent global will needs to be present to make these mechanisms a reality. (shrink)

It has been nearly fifty years since the collapse of the Nazi regime; is there any longer a point to presenting for the apprehension and prosecution of surviving Nazi war criminals? In this carefully argued book, Alan Rosenbaum makes it clear that there is. This book is an important contribution to Jewish and Holocaust studies, to political and social thought, and to moral theory, arguing that we must continue to pursue the prosecutorial agenda as an investment in the (...) moral climate in which we wish to live. (shrink)

This paper details a combined graduate/undergraduate course on the Holocaust. This course was designed to cover the legal, social, political, and moral dimensions of the Holocaust, as well as to familiarize students with its significant historical details and persons. Special attention was devoted to the question of why the perpetrators of the Holocaust should be brought to justice, making connections to contemporary forms of prejudice and discrimination and emphasizing that such efforts at justice are not an issue between Jews and (...) Holocaust perpetrators but a matter of upholding the rule of law. The specifics of the legal cases brought against various Nazis in order to try them as war criminals were examined through both modern and contemporary theoretical frameworks (e.g. early legal positivism vs. decisionism), and other key philosophical themes were introduced throughout the term in order to provide frameworks for discussion and critique. The author reviews course requirements and discusses the implicit anti-Semitism expressed by students, concluding with a brief consideration of the value of such a course beyond the classroom. (shrink)

An excellent sampling of current thinking in the theory and practice of constitutionalism. Each essay was written specifically for this volume by well-known legal and political philosophers. . . . All in all, a first-rate and provocative example of contemporary philosophical concerns. Choice In our constitutional democracy, the dissent and conflict that are the inevitable consequence of free political dialogue point to the importance of reexamining the philosophical premises on which our conceptions of society and government are based. This volume (...) of original essays reviews the foundations of constitutionalism in classical liberal thought and looks at contemporary philosophical perspectives on a wide range of constitutional issues. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers and constitutional scholars, it provides a deeper understanding of the U.S. Constitution as a political instrument and examines the idea of constitutionalism as it functions in our modern world. (shrink)

The socio-economic “pro-democracy” revolutions which are currently sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the name of glasnost and perestroika have virtually stunned all but the best informed in the Western World. The demand for reform throughout the so-called “Soviet block,” and the concomitant impatience with the progress of these changes in the economic and basic social fabric of these societies, have come to exhibit an urgency which few observers, if any, had been able to forecast a few short (...) years ago. The declarations by some members of the U.S. Congress that these changes are indicative of the fact that the cold war has been won by the West, and that we are now witnessing the precipitous collapse of Marxist ideology, together with the widespread sentiment that there is “no going back” to the repressive Leninist-inspired regimes of Stalin, Khruschev, and Brezhniev are all synergistic to the creation of a sentiment of optimism that indeed we have turned the corner in East-West relations. To a world which has lived under the long night of thermonuclear extinction for over four decades, the feeling accompanying the prospect of a possible end to the nightmare of Armageddon further enhances the euphoric sentiment. (shrink)

In this paper I shall defend the thesis that differing concepts of human nature (or “personhood”) lead to different ideas about what “human rights” are, about what types there are, and how rights are to be ranked according to priority. Though some correlation is obvious, as evidenced in the literature, political forums, and in case studies of many nation-states, the question that we will consider is whether this correlation is a causal relationship or whether it is merely accidental and hence, (...) not worthy of any but passing notice. But if, as I believe, some definite causal connection, perhaps in combination with other factors does exist, we are quite right in focusing attention on the disparate “personhood” concepts or foundation level which lies uncovered and central to such disagreements about human rights. (shrink)

Chaim Perelman's article in this volume first set me on the path of human rights ethics. A professor of Rhetoric, he understood the construction of human rights to be the construction of a universal audience, or potential universal audience, for the exercise of freedom of expression.

This paper lays out the basic structure of any view involving coincident entities, in the light of the grounding problem. While the account is not novel, I highlight fundamental features, to which attention is not usually properly drawn. With this in place, I argue for a number of further claims: The basic differences between coincident objects are modal differences, and any other differences between them need to be explained in terms of these differences. More specifically, the basic difference is not (...) a difference in sort. A number of recent defenses of coincidence, which share the basic structure I outline, misidentify what, in their accounts, plays the basic role of addressing the grounding problem. More tentatively, I argue Coincident entities differ only in these modal properties, and properties they entail. In particular, they do not differ in properties like ‘being a tree,’ ‘being a statue,’ or aesthetic properties, and finally in light of how the account of coincidence offered addresses the grounding problem, the grounding problem provides no reason to prefer monism to pluralism. (shrink)

Reprising and revising a question from Longino regarding an earlier phase of standpoint theory, I raise some issues regarding the place of a substantive normative social theory in the strong objectivity project in Harding’s recent book, Objectivity and Diversity. I offer reasons to think the issue needs to be reframed in the co-constructionist and pluralist setting of the new book but that interesting issues continue to arise in thinking about the philosophical resources feminist philosophies of science can or might rely (...) on. (shrink)

This review explores Gross’s motivations for studying the life of philosopher Richard Rorty and argues that, in the end, the compelling biographical work of the author may hold as much value for considering sociological practice as do the final, more theoretically oriented chapters.

Introduction: Natural necessity, being, and becoming -- Accentuate the negative -- Diffracting dialectic -- Opening totality -- Constellating ethics -- Metacritique I : philosophy's primordial failing -- Metacritique II : dialectic and difference -- Conclusion: Natural necessity and the grounds of justice : natural necessity as material meshwork.

Though ‘evil’ is often used loosely as merely the generic opposite of ‘morally good’, used precisely it is the worst possible term of opprobrium available. In this essay it is taken as applying primarily to persons, secondarily to conduct; evil deeds must flow from the volition to do something evil. An evil action is one so horrendously bad that no ordinary decent human being can conceive of doing it, and an evil person is one who knowingly wills or orders such (...) actions. Malignant evil—doing evil because it is evil—is not just possible but real, and is one of several kinds of evil delineated. There are incidental discussions of cruelty, Rosenbaum on Explaining Hitler, Baumeister on Evil, and Benn on wickedness. Footnotes1 Dedicated to Alan Gewirth, in honour of his 90th birthday, and in appreciation of his superb, illuminating, and ground-breaking philosophical work over many years. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the general view of terrorism put forward by Jan Narveson in his “Pacificism and Terrorism: Why We Should Condemn Both” and by Alan Rosenbaum in his “On Terrorism and the Just War: Some Philosophical Reflections.” This is the view that terrorism is morally indefensible. Contra Narveson and Rosenbaum, I argue that some forms of terrorism are morally defensible in some circumstances.In the first section of the paper I will discuss the definition of (...) terrorism, including the definitions put forward by Narveson and Rosenbaum. In the second section, I will outline an account of collective moral responsibility as a necessary precursor to identifying potentially morally defensible forms of terrorism. In the third section I outline a morally defensible form of terrorism, namely terrorism in which certain categories of morally culpable non-attackers are targeted. (shrink)

Alan Bailey offers a clear exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism.

While acknowledging its theory-ladeness, Chalmers (history and philosophy, U. of Sydney) defends the objectivity of scientific knowledge against those critics for whom such knowledge is both subjective and ideological.

An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way. In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An upshot is that (...) although knowledge matters because truth matters this should not be understood to mean that knowledge matters because true belief matters. (shrink)

Using the context of controversies surrounding evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) and the possibility of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, I provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization). These two characteristics are salient because the goals that organize and regulate scientific practice, including the activity of using a theory, are heterogeneous. This means that the same theory can be structured differently, in part because (...) theory presentations (as idealizations) intentionally depart from different features known to be present in a theory. Since there are diverse and potentially incompatible theory structures derived from heterogeneous goals found in scientific practices, a question arises about the absence of a unifying theory structure in the background. The notion of a “theory façade” offers a fruitful perspective on this potentially unsettling result. (shrink)